16 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 7127 | If men are good you should keep promises, but they aren't, so you needn't [Machiavelli] |
| 6309 | The principle foundations of all states are good laws and good armies [Machiavelli] |
| 6306 | People are vengeful, so be generous to them, or destroy them [Machiavelli] |
| 6305 | To retain a conquered state, wipe out the ruling family, and preserve everything else [Machiavelli] |
| 6308 | A sensible conqueror does all his harmful deeds immediately, because people soon forget [Machiavelli] |
| 6307 | A desire to conquer, and men who do it, are always praised, or not blamed [Machiavelli] |
| 7486 | Machiavelli emancipated politics from religion [Machiavelli, by Watson] |