17 ideas
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 22687 | Maybe literary assessment is evaluating the artist as a suitable friend [Gaut] |
| 299 | What is fine is always difficult [Plato] |
| 22686 | Formalists say aesthetics concerns types of beauty, or unity, complexity and intensity [Gaut] |
| 22690 | 'Moralism' says all aesthetic merits are moral merits [Gaut] |
| 297 | What is fine is the parent of goodness [Plato] |
| 22684 | Good ethics counts towards aesthetic merit, and bad ethics counts against it [Gaut] |
| 22689 | If we don't respond ethically in the way a work prescribes, that is an aesthetic failure [Gaut] |
| 22685 | Good art does not necessarily improve people (any more than good advice does) [Gaut] |
| 298 | While sex is very pleasant, it should be in secret, as it looks contemptible [Plato] |