18 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |