14 ideas
| 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution [Misak] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
| 3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
| 3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
| 3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |