Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Tractatus Theologico-Politicus', 'Logical Properties' and 'A Powerful Particulars View of Causation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


105 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn]
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson]
Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson]
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza]
Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson]
The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza]
Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza]
Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza]
Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza]
Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza]
The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza]
People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza]
Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza]
In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza]
No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza]
Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza]
The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson]
Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson]
Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson]
Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson]
One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson]
Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson]
Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson]
Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson]
Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn]
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza]