29 ideas
18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |