18 ideas
| 22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
| 22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
| 22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
| 23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
| 22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
| 22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
| 22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
| 22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |