Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to G.H. Schaller', 'Virtues and Vices' and 'Value Theory'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22396 We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
22397 Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
4871 A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
22402 Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
23145 Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
22401 Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
22398 Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
22403 Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
22400 Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]