19 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
4871 | A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |