Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letter to G.H. Schaller', 'Virtues and Vices' and 'Action'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
22396 We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
22397 Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
4871 A thing is free if it acts only by the necessity of its own nature [Spinoza]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
22402 Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
23145 Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
22401 Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
22398 Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
22403 Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
22400 Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]