Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Scientific Image', 'Troubles with Functionalism' and 'works'

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19 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Avoid punishment, then get rewards, avoid rejection, avoid guilt, accept contracts, follow conscience [Kohlberg, by Wilson,EO]