Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Essence of Aesthetic', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'The Limits of Contingency'

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21 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851 Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18849 Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen]
18850 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen]
18858 Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen]
18857 Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen]
18856 Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848 Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855 Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853 A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20422 The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854 The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen]