Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Essence of Aesthetic', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'On Concept and Object'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20422 The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce]