Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Essence of Aesthetic', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'The Emergence of Probability'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce]