13 ideas
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
9216 | Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K] |
9214 | Unsupported testimony may still be believable [Fine,K] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
20422 | The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce] |
9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |