Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Essence of Aesthetic', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'First-Order Logic'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W]
There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W]
I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W]
Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
The experience of expression and communication are intermingled in art [Croce]