Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?' and 'Pragmatism and Deflationism'

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24 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10482 The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10492 A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
10485 Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10484 The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
10491 Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
10483 Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
10490 Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10488 It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10487 I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10489 We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]