38 ideas
| 3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
| 7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
| 20298 | The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey] |
| 3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
| 2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
| 3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
| 7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
| 3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
| 5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
| 2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
| 3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
| 2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
| 2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
| 3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| 20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 20294 | 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey] |
| 20293 | Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey] |
| 20297 | Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey] |
| 20301 | The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey] |
| 20302 | An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey] |
| 20303 | Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey] |
| 20299 | If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |