11 ideas
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
| 12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
| 12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |