Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Science without Numbers' and 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'

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64 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis]
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis]
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis]
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis]
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis]
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]