40 ideas
| 7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
| 4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
| 4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
| 10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
| 10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
| 10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
| 10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
| 10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
| 10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
| 10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
| 14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
| 14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
| 10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
| 10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
| 10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
| 10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
| 10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
| 10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
| 10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
| 10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
| 10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
| 14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
| 14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
| 7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
| 7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
| 4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
| 14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
| 7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
| 14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
| 7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
| 7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
| 14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
| 14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
| 14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| 7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |