12 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |