Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Mind, Brain and the Quantum' and 'W.V. Quine'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood]
Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood]