Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' and 'A Philosophy of Boredom'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen]
Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen]
We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen]
The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen]