Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' and 'Mathematical logic and theory of types'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell]
Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave]
Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock]
Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock]
Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]