Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Causal and Metaphysical Necessity' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
7861 Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
6660 Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]