14 ideas
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |