Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Knowledge First (and reply)' and 'Two-Dimensional Semantics'

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32 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson]
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson]
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson]
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson]
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter]
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]