55 ideas
| 4697 | There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn' [O'Grady] |
| 4731 | Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady] |
| 4735 | Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality [O'Grady] |
| 4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
| 4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
| 4705 | Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system [O'Grady] |
| 4700 | A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady] |
| 4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
| 4711 | Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties [O'Grady] |
| 4698 | What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady] |
| 4715 | We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them [O'Grady] |
| 4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |
| 4720 | Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady] |
| 4722 | Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification [O'Grady] |
| 4724 | Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady] |
| 4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
| 4709 | Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady] |
| 4725 | Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests [O'Grady] |
| 4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
| 18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
| 4710 | Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts' [O'Grady] |
| 4717 | If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable [O'Grady] |
| 4706 | Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation [O'Grady] |
| 4734 | Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it [O'Grady] |
| 7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
| 6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
| 18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
| 18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
| 18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
| 18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
| 18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
| 18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
| 18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
| 18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
| 18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
| 18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
| 18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
| 18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
| 18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
| 18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
| 18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
| 18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
| 18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
| 18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| 18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
| 18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
| 18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
| 18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
| 18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
| 18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
| 18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
| 18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
| 18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
| 4727 | The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas [O'Grady] |