Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'Word and Object' and 'Phaedo'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato]
If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau]
Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato]