13 ideas
9879 | NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
7861 | Libet says the processes initiated in the cortex can still be consciously changed [Libet, by Papineau] |
6660 | Libet found conscious choice 0.2 secs before movement, well after unconscious 'readiness potential' [Libet, by Lowe] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |