20 ideas
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
18758 | Validity is provable, but invalidity isn't, because the model is infinite [Church, by McGee] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |