Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Theory of Science (4 vols)', 'Letters to Hegel' and 'Evidence'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
7807 The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9618 Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9830 Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17265 Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9185 Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19683 Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19685 Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22073 The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]