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All the ideas for 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic', 'works' and 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
4261 The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
20945 Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
4255 Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
4256 The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4258 Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
4259 External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
4260 Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
7666 God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin]