111 ideas
| 18330 | Judging by the positive forces, the Renaissance was the last great age [Nietzsche] |
| 2900 | I revere Heraclitus [Nietzsche] |
| 2913 | Thucydides was the perfect anti-platonist sophist [Nietzsche] |
| 2909 | Thinking has to be learned in the way dancing has to be learned [Nietzsche] |
| 14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2892 | Wanting a system in philosophy is a lack of integrity [Nietzsche] |
| 14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2896 | I want to understand the Socratic idea that 'reason equals virtue equals happiness' [Nietzsche] |
| 2897 | With dialectics the rabble gets on top [Nietzsche] |
| 2898 | Anything which must first be proved is of little value [Nietzsche] |
| 14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18317 | The 'real being' of things is a nothingness constructed from contradictions in the actual world [Nietzsche] |
| 18315 | We get the concept of 'being' from the concept of the 'ego' [Nietzsche] |
| 14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18316 | The grounds for an assertion that the world is only apparent actually establish its reality [Nietzsche] |
| 14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18314 | In language we treat 'ego' as a substance, and it is thus that we create the concept 'thing' [Nietzsche] |
| 14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
| 14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18323 | Any explanation will be accepted as true if it gives pleasure and a feeling of power [Nietzsche] |
| 14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18310 | The 'highest' concepts are the most general and empty concepts [Nietzsche] |
| 3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
| 3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
| 20368 | There are no 'individual' persons; we are each the sum of humanity up to this moment [Nietzsche] |
| 14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 2899 | The fanatical rationality of Greek philosophy shows that they were in a state of emergency [Nietzsche] |
| 18313 | The big error is to think the will is a faculty producing effects; in fact, it is just a word [Nietzsche] |
| 20133 | The 'motive' is superficial, and may even hide the antecedents of a deed [Nietzsche] |
| 18326 | The beautiful never stands alone; it derives from man's pleasure in man [Nietzsche] |
| 20101 | Without music life would be a mistake [Nietzsche] |
| 2902 | Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche] |
| 18311 | Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche] |
| 18324 | There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche] |
| 2904 | The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche] |
| 2895 | The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche] |
| 18322 | When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche] |
| 2893 | In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche] |
| 18308 | A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| 2894 | Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche] |
| 18321 | To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche] |
| 18319 | Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche] |
| 2903 | A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche] |
| 2891 | Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche] |
| 18327 | A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche] |
| 15606 | Military idea: what does not kill me makes me stronger [Nietzsche] |
| 18328 | Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche] |
| 18331 | Democracy is organisational power in decline [Nietzsche] |
| 18332 | The creation of institutions needs a determination which is necessarily anti-liberal [Nietzsche] |
| 2911 | True justice is equality for equals and inequality for unequals [Nietzsche] |
| 18320 | To renounce war is to renounce the grand life [Nietzsche] |
| 2908 | There is a need for educators who are themselves educated [Nietzsche] |
| 18329 | Sometimes it is an error to have been born - but we can rectify it [Nietzsche] |
| 2905 | 'Purpose' is just a human fiction [Nietzsche] |
| 14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18312 | The supreme general but empty concepts must be compatible, and hence we get 'God' [Nietzsche] |
| 2906 | By denying God we deny human accountability, and thus we redeem the world [Nietzsche] |
| 2901 | How could the Church intelligently fight against passion if it preferred poorness of spirit to intelligence? [Nietzsche] |
| 18325 | Christians believe that only God can know what is good for man [Nietzsche] |
| 18318 | People who disparage actual life avenge themselves by imagining a better one [Nietzsche] |