Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are Persons Bodies?', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'Logicism in the 21st Century'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]