22 ideas
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
3238 | 'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B] |
3239 | You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B] |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |