Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Justification of Deduction' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19066 Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
19067 A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
19060 Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11066 Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
19058 Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
19063 Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
19059 In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
19062 Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
19065 Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
19061 An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064 Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
4366 We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]