Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?', 'Logic [1897]' and 'First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10751 Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
10757 Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
10759 There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10753 Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
10752 Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10754 In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10756 A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10758 If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10761 Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
10755 A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
11052 Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
12790 Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12789 Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
14388 Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan]
14386 Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan]
12787 Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan]
14384 We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
14389 There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
14387 Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
14382 Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14385 Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
14383 A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan]