16 ideas
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |