Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'Animal Rights and Wrongs'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


47 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]