15 ideas
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |