14 ideas
| 8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
| 8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
| 8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
| 8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
| 8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
| 8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |