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All the ideas for 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter', 'Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
9456 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
7548 Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9457 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
9458 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
9461 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
7545 Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
7549 If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
7553 Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7546 A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7550 We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
9460 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
9459 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
7551 Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
7547 Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
7552 Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]