Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Denoting', 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' and 'On the Moral and Legal State of Abortion'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


70 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / b. Modern philosophy beginnings
Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer]
"Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine]
Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan]
Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey]
The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich]
Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell]
Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A]
Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G]
Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell]
The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell]
Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell]
Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk]
Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell]
A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati]
Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell]
In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We only really love children and work [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche]
We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche]