Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History' and 'Actualism and Possible Worlds'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]