19 ideas
21753 | If we look at the world rationally, the world assumes a rational aspect [Hegel] |
21974 | The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel] |
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |