Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'The Big Book of Concepts' and 'Reality is Not What it Seems'

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47 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy]
The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy]
Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy]
Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy]
The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy]
Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy]
The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy]
The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy]
Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy]
Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy]
The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy]
Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy]
Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy]
Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy]
The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]