Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood', 'Phil of Mathematics: why nothing works' and 'Identity and Necessity'

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11 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6343 For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
3663 How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
7534 In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]