Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter', 'Letters to Bentley' and 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
7548 Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
13152 We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
13151 Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
7545 Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
7553 Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
7549 If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
3995 A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7546 A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7550 We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
15863 The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8340 I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
13150 The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
12178 That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
7551 Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
7547 Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
7552 Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]